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Abstract. In order to guarantee better user-friendliness and higher
accuracy, beyond the existing traditional single-factor biometric systems,
the multimodal ones appear to be more promising. Two or more biomet-
ric measurements for the same identity are extracted, stored and com-
pared during the enrollment, authentication and identification processes.
Deployed multimodal biometric systems also referred to as multibiomet-
rics or even as multimodalities are commonly found and used in elec-
tronic chips, embedded in travel documents. The widespread use of such
systems, the nature of the shared data and the importance of applica-
tions introduce privacy risks. A significant number of approaches and
very recent advances to the relevant protection technologies have been
published. This paper illustrates a comprehensive overview of research in
multibiometrics, the protection of their templates and the privacy issues
that arise. Up-to-date review of the existing literature revealing the cur-
rent state-of-art suggestions is provided, based on the different levels
of fusion and the employed protection algorithms, while an outlook to
future prospects is also discussed.
Keywords: Multimodal biometric systems · Multibiometrics · Multi-
modalities · Levels of fusion · Biometric template protection scheme ·
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1 Introduction
Biometric authentication is the science of establishing the identity of a user,
towards a system, based on his/her physical or behavioral attributes [1]. During
the last decade, the field of biometric authentication has gained growing pop-
ularity as biometric traits are becoming the next generation method that will
widely replace the user name and password as the primary way of authentica-
tion, in the next 2–3 years. In addition to the idea that biometric characteristics
are only useful in forensics, the pronounced necessity for reliable day-to-day
transactions, has led to a range of applications that verify the identity of a per-
son using human properties. Systems are increasingly being deployed and used
throughout the world [53], from limited simple home or business applications
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(the controlled access to a room), to large-scale projects, which are involved in
societal functions, such as user verification for on-line transactions (e.g. banking
ePayments, mobile devices). Finally, it is a common secret that biometrics have
been used in the scope of surveillance themes. Remarkably, not only the indus-
try, but also the military, law enforcement, and security agencies invest in the
development and manufacture of facial, iris and voice recognition technologies,
capable of detecting and identifying anyone.
Traditional deployments are mainly uni-modal biometric systems and may
have limited usage. The fact is that no single sample from the modality biomet-
ric is sufficiently accurate in real-world applications [28], where it is demanded
from designers to produce robust systems with low error rates and sufficient
tamper proof protection [43]. Nevertheless, they constitute the starting point of
each research into the direction of multibiometric systems which seeks to reduce
some of their drawbacks [20], by consolidating recognition process using multi-
ple templates extracted from the same person (e.g., fingerprint, iris, face, hand
geometry, gait, keystroke dynamics) [36,37].
A biometric system is essentially a pattern recognition scheme that compares
the tested features of a user with the stored ones, from the process of a previ-
ous enrollment. Each system can operate in identification or verification mode,
where the system processes a measurement from which a biometrics template is
extracted [19]. The concept of fusion in biometrics, helps to expand the feature
space used to claim an identity, and thus, affects the matching accuracy of the
system [24]. Multibiometric recognition in different levels of fusion can improve
the performance, deter spoofing, and increase the overall accuracy of these sys-
tems. Considering these enrichments, the system will be more reliable and thus,
more acceptable to be used in a number of related applications [4,28,42].
Studies in these areas [5,32,37,38,45], aim to answer a crucial question: How
can the leakage of stored biometric characteristics, to unauthorized individuals,
be prevented? A variety of risks exist that call for protection of the stored ele-
ments, after the fusion of the templates. From a privacy viewpoint, most concerns
against the common use of biometrics arise from the multiple modalities used to
describe a single user, the sensitive nature of these data and the potential leak-
age of this information from devices that store it. Taking this into consideration,
the security of the user’s identity should be addressed, with a privacy perspec-
tive [21] and should be examined by different points of view. The elements that
can reveal the identity of the user should be protected, while simultaneously, pre-
venting him/her from opening multiple accounts using false data and covering
the requirements for unique identifiers. Solutions such as the helper data sys-
tem, fuzzy vault algorithms, cancelable biometrics and others come to promise
improvements in this filed, while experimental studies have shown that these
technologies can bring improved verification performance.
Multibiometric template protection is the source that has motivated numer-
ous works in the field of the combination of pattern recognition methodologies
with the world of cryptography. From research perspective, results about the
significant advantages in accuracy, reliability and security of biometric systems
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can promise protection of their storage. State-of-the-art proposals offer different
scenarios to these concerns, while very recent experiments shift the target to the
deployment of a unique generic category of systems [6,52]. The idea behind this
statement is that the systems development will be able to support many appli-
cations based on multiple pieces of evidence under one human identity, capable
of performing well on large-scale datasets. They should be designed in such a
smart way that can offer overall security, beyond well-known risks or the nature
of the transactions.
This work is motivated by very recent advances in the areas of multibiometric
recognition and biometric template protection, and its aim is to contribute to
the studies of the interaction between biometrics and cryptography, presenting
concrete, published results of the last four years. The time period of the works
is carefully selected to serve the research in the entrance of biometrics in cryp-
tography world, reflecting the increasing number of projects that aim to suggest
solutions for the protection of user’s identity, in case of risks during on-line trans-
actions. These complementary security technologies can bring improvements in
security and reliability of the systems, while strengthening public acceptance of
the involved applications [7]. The remainder of this survey is organised as follows:
In the next section, the importance of multimodalities against single modals is
underlined, the different levels of fusion for multibiometric data are analysed, and
template protection techniques are reviewed. Using this as the background of a
new promising idea, the section of related work contains a comparative summary
of multimodal biometrics and template protection in combination. The fourth
section introduces the major privacy and security issues that arise. Finally, in
the last section, a comprehensive conclusion, including the current approaches,
is given and some remarks for discussion are presented.
2 Background
This section presents briefly the basic knowledge around the technology of bio-
metric systems, starting from the way that these can be gathered, and suggesting
the cryptographic methods that can be used for the protection of a biometric
element in a database, in terms of security. The process, according to the appli-
cation, the type of scenarios, the nature of the stored templates and their rep-
resentation play an important role to the characterization of each system as a
reliable and secure enough or not. The literature review in this area is exten-
sive and it could not be fully addressed in this part. The target of the next
subsections is to present the fusion of biometrics and the use of cryptographic
techniques, introducing readers to enlightenment.
2.1 Multibiometric System Recognition
Data fusion in biometric systems is commonly an active area with numerous
applications being not only a solution to the problems of uni-modalities, but
also an active research field [3,28]. Vendors are already deploying systems that
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use two or three patterns for the same user, providing recognition even on large-
scale datasets. Information fusion constitutes a way to enhance the matching
accuracy of the system without resorting to other measurements or techniques,
but just, being based only on the template.
Information Fusion. The three different factors of recognition performance of
the gathered data are given in the following list.
Feature Level Fusion. The specific method comprises the strategies which per-
tain to the sensor, the set, rank and decision level. For the first one, in a concrete
way, it is worth to be mentioned that this fusion level involves augmenting the
vectors arising from the extractors and subjecting the vector to a transformation
algorithm [35,48]. The elements can enhance the performance.
Furthermore, information from multiple feature sets can be used to refine the
template. Using the third category, a rank level fusion is suitable for biometric
systems operating in the identification mode.
Finally, the last level fusion consists of artifacts coming from the final outputs
of an individual sub-system, and wisely is mentioned as the simplest form of
fusion. The correlation between the main inputs has to be examined, in order to
evaluate the improvements in matching performance.
Score Level Fusion. On this level of fusion, matching scores are returned by each
individual sub-system and the obtained output scores are combined. The sug-
gested ways underline the necessity for a normalised score, aiming to improve the
reliability of the system. There are three basic groups: density based, transforma-
tion based and classifier based schemes. The performance of each scheme depends
on the quantity and the quality of the involved informative data. Major issues, like
the limited number of the available training samples, or, the lack of homogeneity,
can be further investigated, using the previously mentioned approaches [10].
To conclude, always considering that a multibiometric system is affected by
the correlation [50], the combination of the weak uncorrelated biometric match-
ers can lead to better performance, than combining the strong ones, positively
correlated. Using this starting point, score level becomes the most popular level
among the others, and uncorrelated traits are applied in recognition systems,
increasing, successfully, the desirable accuracy [40].
Decision Level Fusion. This level fusion is termed so because it depends on
the final, acceptance or rejection, decisions. Auxiliary information is available to
systems with high dependence from the application. Gathering the information
by independent sub-systems, and fusing the results, constitutes a way to increase
the overall precision, supporting the idea for universality of the entire system
[13]. Mainly, the conducted research in this area is still immature. Fusion schemes
that incorporate parts into a whole final scheme have not been yet explored [9].
Suggestions for combining soft biometric characteristics [48], like the gender, age
or the ethnicity of the user, with the inputs of biometric samples, can be used
to verify the person’s identity.
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The presented themes provide an overview of the first tendency to the direc-
tion of covering the problematic areas of conventional biometric systems. The
combination of popular traits, such as the iris and the fingerprints, is embed-
ded in many applications. The conducted tests demonstrate advantages, while
introducing new tasks. The evaluation of a complete biometric system is a com-
plex issue and requires stronger user involvement for feature level schemes [31].
Compact multibiometric templates need to be generated, offering, in this way,
an improved concrete content of information. Nevertheless, the most important
drawback of fusion is the central storage of the data, coming from the same or
different sources. This is a complex characteristic that should be addressed in
order to prevent further privacy threats. Last, but not least, the precision of the
model feature distributions, and the estimation of the possibilities to practice
the theory in large databases, are still intricate issues [33].
2.2 Biometric Template Protection
Template Protection can be simply described as a straightforward and novel cryp-
tographic construction. Biometrics can be found where personal information is
employed to authenticate users, and here the readings are inherently noisy, not
only because of their nature, but also, because of the pattern recognition tech-
niques [14,31]. However, such architectures have been used in a number of real-
world, error-prone environments. Due to security concerns that arise from the
storage of these data, several techniques [26] provide mechanisms, that can face
the technical weaknesses of parameterization, representing a primitive with a spe-
cial property of error-tolerance. The final aim is to improve the reliability of the
systems and enlarge the chances for public acceptance and user confidence [17].
Categories. Biometric characteristics are largely immutable and any kind of
compromise is undesirable [1,27]. The standard encryption algorithms do not
support a comparison of biometric templates in an encrypted domain, leav-
ing important personal information totally exposed, during the authentication.
While user authentication is based on possession of secret keys, key management
is performed introducing another layer of authentication. In this way, encryption
of data inherits the security of according biometrics applied to release correct
decrypting keys. Biometric template protection schemes are usually categorised
in two main groups and are designed to meet the requirements of biometric data
protection [48]. Schematic illustration is shown in Fig. 1.
Cancelable Biometrics also referred to as feature transformations are designed in
a way, that it should be computationally difficult to recover the original informa-
tion [37,56]. The idea is to apply transformations that do not affect the elements,
while are tolerant to variations. The basic fact, in this category, is that cance-
lable biometrics consist of intentional distortions of signals that are repeatedly
transformed, similarly to those between templates in the transformed domain.
Techniques of transformation modify the template in a user specific way. Dur-
ing authentication, the same transformation is applied to the biometric query,
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Fig. 1. Categorisation of template protection schemes.
and the matching is performed in the already transformed area, so as to avoid
the exposition of the original stored template [47].
A weak point of the system is that the transformation key is stored along
with the biometric template. One solution for this can be the non-invertibility of
the used transformation function, even in those cases, where the attacker knows
the key. Furthermore, assuming beforehand that the transformed biometric data
may be compromised, the parameters should be changed, in order to secure the
template. Finally, to prevent the tracking subjects by cross-matching databases
processes, recent studies have tested methods for applying different transforma-
tions for different applications [9,33].
Cancelable biometrics are distinguished in two categories: non-invertible
transforms and biometric salting. Academic research in this area consists of
numerous works that can be further classified. It is worth mentioning that pub-
lished works, in this area, apply the techniques of robust hashing systems and bio-
hashing in specific modalities, studying the error rates, with remarkable results.
These examinations also include analysis of the design from a constructional and
security aspect, and evaluating the behavior of those schemes against potential
attacks [35].
Biometric Cryptosystems are designed to securely bind a digital key to a biomet-
ric feature or generate a key from it. The idea, for a design of robust keys, started
as a solution to threats like copying, sharing and distributing biometrics from the
initial genuine storage. This is the reason for their second name, as helper data
methods. Based on schemes which perform fuzzy comparisons, using decision
thresholds, original templates are replaced through biometric-dependent public
information. Specifically, secure sketches are derived from the biometric template
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after the enrollment process. This sketch is stored in the system, instead of the
original template, in a form of a function. This mixture is obtained by binding
the template with an error-correcting code, which itself is defined by a key. The
strength, in terms of security, is the absence of the user’s data, which however is
a drawback for this design. Security relies on the difficulty to recover the tem-
plate, using as attacks an authentication query or an error-correcting code. Some
examples of biometric cryptosystems are fuzzy vault schemes, fuzzy extractors,
and secret sharing approaches, secure sketches and others. Typically, these are
separated into two main categories according to the schemes, as key-binding or
key-generation [17].
Both technologies aimed to meet some requirements like non-invertibility
where, given a protected template, it should be difficult for the attacker to find
a biometric feature set that will match with the initial one. Second, we need revo-
cability where versions of protected templates can be generated from the same
biometric data and, concurrently, the protected templates should not allow cross-
matching process, obeying to the necessity for diversity of data representations
[40]. The use of these techniques can offer advantages, taking into account the
uses cases, a fact that is also underlined in some published works [13,16,21,54],
where different approaches and combinations can be presented. In general, com-
paring the two methods of protection, cryptosystems tending to have stronger
non-invertibility transformation schemes also offer unlinkability. Separately, or
using hybrid products of their connection, several traditional attacks against sys-
tems have been prevented and the generated template is usually strong enough
to be reconstructed, which is a feature that increases privacy and, consequently,
the social acceptance [38].
3 Related Work
As it was mentioned above, the limited security of multimodal recognition sys-
tems, the drawbacks of biometric template protection technologies and the major
absence of practicality to the recognition algorithms, involved in these creations,
have motivated researchers to examine the possibilities for a fortunate combi-
nation of the two areas [2,37]. From an academic perspective, multibiometric
template protection has several different facets [20]. At the same time, indus-
trial actions attempt to establish a framework that can be effectively used to
understand the issues and progress in the area while evaluating the needs of the
applications [29,50]. At any rate, the relation between biometrics and protec-
tion techniques brings new challenges and illustrates efforts for further scenarios
which can promise better overall accuracy of the system [19,32]. Literature sur-
vey has revealed a number of experimental works or approaches that are focused
on the most frequently used biometrics (iris, fingerprint, face pattern) and aim
at reducing the errors and providing higher security [15,50]. This section, briefly,
refers to the most notable architectures, according to current methods that aim
to equip sensors used in environments, where the personal data constitute a
sensitive element [2,14,39,40].
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3.1 Multibiometric Template Protection
Current literature in biometric template protection, key approaches to cryp-
tosystems or cancelable biometrics and multiple biometric templates from the
same source have been examined. Early studies, which required an alignment of
biometric templates, have demonstrated efficiency with specific combinations of
personal data. Different techniques have been proposed to overcome the short-
comings of pre-alignment methods [9,45]. Some of the schemes have been applied
to physiological or behavioral biometrics [46]. Respecting the necessity for use
the most easily captured biometric features, from a pattern recognition aspect,
biometrics have been selected to map biohashing, block permutation, fuzzy vaults
and commitments schemes [41,44].
As a second approach, the collaboration of template protection with multibio-
metrics can be achieved with several notable approaches that have been proposed
and evaluated according to the ability to correct the error ratio. For example,
multi-algorithm fusion at feature level, multibiometric cryptosystem fuzzy vault
based on fingerprint and iris [51], fuzzy commitments for face [49] and other
ideas for score fusion level were successfully applied to fingerprints with secu-
rity advances and many other combinations under various scenarios have been
proposed during the last three years [23,51]. The target is to provide a uniform
distribution of errors [30], combining successfully the data and covering research
gaps of previous works, and thus, contributing to secure, stable systems [25,54],
while offering, a fast comparison of protected templates suitable for biometric
recognition in identification mode.
3.2 Ideas for Incorporation
Industrial projects are focused on the creation of a generic framework, similar to
the one schematically presented below. The system should be capable of incorpo-
rating n templates, without the necessity to follow specific fusion levels for their
representation, (k representations could be involved). The process is continued
with a common representation and then the generic system is applied for the
protection of the template (Fig. 2).
Analysing the idea from the levels aspect, focusing on the first part of this
representation, it seems that biometrics fusion on feature level is the most suit-
able approach for the protection of the templates. Of course, score level fusion is
not enough, besides the approaches of a solutions that offers to many systems.
Nevertheless, cancelable biometric systems based on score level fusion can be
reconstructed, in an analogous way to conventional, but their use to cryptosys-
tems applications is not really popular [55]. Decisions based on final decisions
can be successfully implemented to both system protection areas. Following the
design of this framework, some issues arise, such as the template alignments,
the way of the combination for modalities, the implementation in applications
for the representation of the features [16], the level of the obtained recognition
performance, the correction of the errors and the overall security of the system,
and the way the latter comes to solve any privacy related themes [11].
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Fig. 2. A framework of a generic multibiometric template protection at feature level.
More precisely, a construction of an align-invariant biometric cryptosystem
or cancelable biometrics is not yet fully investigated. Feature level fusion of
templates hinders a proper alignment of protected templates, while auxiliary
data for the use of alignment may leak information on stored templates. Helper
data techniques can probably provide some solution, but this is still unsure. The
desired code length also remains evasive, and this comes to affect the necessity
for error-correction codes. The fact that false rejection rates are lower bounded
by error-correction capacities emerges as a great challenge since each change can
make the system more vulnerable. The representation of the feature can bring
better results but it may necessitate extended efforts in the direction of combi-
nation of many different templates using the fuzzy vault schemes methodology.
Finally, from a biometric template protection perspective, the length of the keys
remains a major topic for discussion.
In conclusion, experiments that have been carried out in different studies with
use of multiple combinations of biometric samples from the same identity and
implemented in several template protection technologies, illustrate significant
improvements with regards to reliability of the relevant applications. Different
proposals of frameworks for the design of cryptosystems or cancelable biometrics
that contain many modalities, have been presented enriching this research field.
In spite of the encouraging results, several other issues might occur and demand
further investigation [23]. Current literature studies are focused on the possibility
to establish a generic model, which will cover the necessity for irreversibility and
unlinkability, and secure enough to be used in many applications. The next
section is dedicated to the emerging issues, from biometrics recognition to the
protection categories, as those were presented above.
4 Security and Privacy Issues
A great number of biometric characteristics are being used in various appli-
cations. The nature of each biometric trait makes it eligible for a variety of
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applications. Beyond, the well-known, common seven factors that underline the
suitability of the data, that is universality, uniqueness, permanence, measurabil-
ity, performance, acceptability, circumvention [37], there are, also, other factors
that should be taken into consideration, especially when biometric systems are
deployed in real-world applications [22,39,40]. Computing environments present
security challenges related to aspects of multimodality [28] while extending and
facilitating the ways of accessing may cause security threats [7]. The system
must, at the same time, behave according to a certain policy of biometrics and
be properly instrumented against attacks and actions performed by non-expert
users, in order to protect information, thus meeting the requirements of irre-
versibility and unlinkability.
After overcoming engineering and technical performance issues [6], the pri-
mary research question to be addressed with regards to a multibiometric system
is: How does the system address privacy concerns regarding its level of provided
security to the relevant application? A starting point is the idea that with improve-
ments of security, privacy as well as systems reliability of two or more biometrics
could be combined in a method that enhances the efficiency. Following this
assumption, multibiometric systems not only can reduce some threats, but also
can be compromised in many ways [18]. In that sense, the leakage of template
information to unauthorized individuals becomes a serious theme. One should
bear in mind, however, that the storage of multiple biometric records of a fused
template of elements, extracted from different traits, under the same identity, may
offer a solution to many risks, but still, this storage has to be protected [9].
4.1 Multibiometric Systems
A multibiometric system increases the degree of confidence while the accuracy,
throughput and scalability could be well estimated. Approximately, using the
proposed fusion levels for different biometric traits in unconstrained environ-
ments and after the experimental performance analysis, there is an ability to
reduce the levels of noise [6,48]. On the other hand, multimodalities overcome
limitations such as error-correcting capability and non-universality and this is a
field which requires improvements [12,42].
4.2 Biometric Template Protection Technologies
Biometric template protection technologies present several advantages over
generic biometric systems. In particular, attention is paid to immutability, because
it is the basic characteristic of biometrics. The schemes, as these are previously
categorised using this point, enhance privacy providing reliable authentication
at a significant level. Specifically, the original template is concealed, the recon-
struction becomes extremely efficient [9,42] and the methods ensure, in some
sort, the revocability and renewability of the template. Published studies pro-
vide tests using traditional attacks against the systems and introduce not only
the strong fundamental spots, but also, the obscured ones [21,42,49]. For bio-
metric cryptosystems, the key entropy, the tolerance levels, during the processes,
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and the metrics are the quantities that lack further investigation [9,19]. Then,
the amount of the applicable parameters should be examined closely, consider-
ing their important role in the definition of a restricted key space, something
that puts at risk the security of the methods which use cancelable biometrics.
In conclusion, in order to avoid fraud, privacy leakage should be decreased and
the major requirement of unlinkability must be met. Furthermore, the align-
ment affects the recognition performance, the absence of a unified architecture
brings confusion across the applications [25] and the desired properties for error-
correction codes remain unattained.
4.3 Combination of Cryptography and Multimodalities
It is an undeniable fact that the combination of cryptography and multibiomet-
rics introduces a number of successful mechanisms that ensure information pri-
vacy. Some of the approaches presented in the previous paragraphs of this section
may be adopted as solutions, but, still other situations will occur. Precisely, the
alignment of the protected templates is an essential task [9], and the represen-
tation of feature vectors remains an important line of research. Experiments on
protected biometric data [42] lead to the assumption that the low boundaries
between the false rejection rates and the error-correction capacities compound
a more vulnerable system and at the same time, the requirements for stable
biometric features are, definitely, non-trivial. Some of the approaches show that
the protocols in the literature do not secure the encoding procedures [25] while
others provide multiple suggestions for the distribution of reliability, or concen-
trate the efforts to the improvement of recognition rates [34]. With respect to
the different multimodal biometrics template protection schemes, the interesting
side contains the concentrated trials for a generic framework, focused on unified
representation of biometric features, under the combination of the suggested pro-
tection designs. Relevant to the mechanisms and for the improvement of security
and privacy, the requirements, according to Biometric Template Protection Stan-
dardization ISO/IEC 24745 [58] need to be covered and clearly addressed, while
the accuracy of each concept should be tested.
The last element in this list is some of the most popular introduced privacy
methods and the security issues currently on debate. Beyond all the techni-
cal cases that arise from the use of multimodalities, when those are applied to
template protection schemes, their fusion leads to a number of issues. While,
researchers suggest the use of multimodalities, other approaches [57] induce dif-
ferent findings and set the dilemma about the choice of the use of multimodal
biometrics instead of uni-modal ones, in order to contribute to a protection of
the user against undesired biometric checking. Some other open research ques-
tions from privacy aspect, which need to be further examined are: Does the
system exclude the threats that can arise, considering the possibility to perform
the biometric procedure without notice and/or against the will of the user? How
can the user protect himself/herself against undesired biometric checking? One
step further, the biometric databases, created to support a range of applications,
the possibility of data correlation with health information [7,8,40,49], and the
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security requirements for data, stored in ePassports or ID cards, cause a risky
uncertainty. Also, the very nature of template protection schemes, introduce
questions about their efficiency for on-line fast identifications, or situations that
involve government applications, and these are some of the areas that need to
be covered extensively.
5 Conclusions and Discussion
In this work, we have presented a concrete approach on the protection of mul-
timodal biometric templates, underlying critical privacy issues, while focusing
on the suggestions for future research. Multimodal biometric systems are mostly
discussed for the impact of their use on publicly accepted, reliable identification
systems [31,53], overcoming the obstacles of uni-modal ones.
Researchers propose different methods for combination of biometric traits,
testing the possibilities that can induce to an effective fusion scheme for highly
accurate recognition systems. During this study, there is an analysis of the three
main fusion levels, in terms of theoretical [37] and recently published experimen-
tal knowledge [6,43]. The limitations of the single characteristic as a verification
tool are revealed, while the vitality of multimodalities against fraudulent tech-
nologies is under examination.
While biometric vendors are deploying multibiometric systems, at the same
time concerns arise from the storage and misuse of the data [9]. The security
of the templates is especially crucial for the confidentiality and integrity of this
sensitive information. In the direction of facing a number of threats, works on the
two main categories of biometric template protection schemes offer important
advantages [19]. However, the significant number of studies on single biometric
data [51] and the lack of security for multimodalities beyond their advantages,
shift the organised and dedicated efforts to the connection of these areas. The
incorporation of multiple biometrics in template protection schemes seems that
can offer suggestions for solution against many drawbacks, while new security
interrogations arise. During the last years, studies attempt to generate a com-
pact generic framework and evaluate each proposed multimodal cryptosystem
on large-scale datasets. In this line, there are still many open research questions,
and the merit of biometric cryptosystems should ideally be expanded. The nature
and privacy properties of a system, that can be used in a generalised multimodal
way, are highly counter-intuitive and deserve a deeper exposition and evaluation
of the ways that could significant to the problematic areas.
Summarising, the selection of the optimal fusion level and the choice for the
appropriate modals as well as their combination present special interest, because
they are the basic challenges in the requirements of each system according to
the application design. After all, biometrics is the new digital enabler in a fast-
advancing technological world and their greatest strength is their uniqueness,
which is also one of their greatest weakness. And if biometric elements are com-
promised during the verification process, the identity of the user is the primary
concern. And it is at this point where cryptographic issues for multibiometrics
need to be further investigated.
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